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728 ESTATE OF BLAm [42 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22852. In Bank. Apr. 27, 1954.] 
Estate of ALFRED G. BLAIR, Deceased. PHOEBE L. 
BONNEN et aI., Respondents, v. NAOMI BLAIR RUOFF 
et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Family Allowance-Right as Statutory.-
The right to a family allowance is entirely statutory. (Prob. 
Code, § 680.) 
[2a,2b] Id. - Family Allowance - Persons Entitled. - While a 
family allowance is favored by the law and Prob. Code, § 680, 
is liberally construed by courts, such section does not authorize 
probate court to make an allowance for benefit of persons 
other than those designated therein. 
[S] \[d.-Family Allowance-Purpose.-Prob. Code, § 680, author-
izing a family allowance, was enacted out of concern for 
needs of surviving family during period of readjustment fol-
lowing death of a spouse. 
[4] Id.-Family Allowance-Relation to Other Rights.-A family 
allowance to meet needs of surviving family is preferred to 
most other claims (Prob. Code, § 750), and on proper applica-
tion it must be granted even if estate is insolvent. 
[6] Id.-Family Allowance-Persons Entitled.-Final clause of 
Prob. Code, § 680, that in discretion of court a family allow-
ance may be granted retroactively to date of decedent's death, 
does not authorize an order granting such allowance to estate 
of deceased widow. 
[6] Id.-Family Allowance: Probate Homesteads.-The statutes 
relating to family allowance (Prob. Code, § 680) and probate 
homestead (Prob. Code, § 661) are based on policy that places 
welfare of decedent's family above interests of his creditors, 
heirs, legatees and devisees; but the rights they confer are 
for members of the family only, and persons outside the family 
cannot assert them by assignment or succession. 
[7] Abatement-Death of Party-Survival of Actions.-Ordinarily 
a right that cannot be assigned does not survive death of 
}lerson entitled to it.' 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 367 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 314 et seq. 
[7] Sell Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 60; Am.Jur., Abate-
ment and Revival, § 80. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 308; [2] De-
cedents' Estates, § 320; [3, 4, 10, 11] Decedents' Estates, § 307; 
[5] Decedents' Estates, § 313; [6] Decedents' Estates, §§ 307, 313, 
376,388; [7J Abatement, § 42; [8J Decedents' Estates, §§ 313, 3SSj 
[9j Decedents' Estates, §§ 307, 3Sl. 
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[8] Decedents' Estates - Family Allowance - Persons Entitled: 
Probate Homesteads-Persons Entitled.-The right to a family 
allowance or probate homestead is lost when the one for whom 
it is asked has lost status on which the right depends. (Disap-
proving Estate of Moore, 170 Cal. 60, 148 P. 205.) 
[9] ld.-Family Allowance-Nature of Right: Probate Homesteads 
-Nature of Right.-The right to a family allowance or pro-
bate homestead is not a vested right, and nothing accrues be-
fore the order granting it. 
[10] ld.-Family Allowance-When Right Accrues.-Where no 
right to a family allowance accrued before death of incom-
petent widow, none could arise thereafter in favor of her 
estate. 
[11] ld.-Family Allowance-Effect of Breach of Duty by Guard-
ian.-Where no application for a family allowance was made 
during widow's lifetime by either' widow or by guardian ap-
pointed after widow was declared incompetent, it is not 
necessary to rule that right to such an allowance exists in favor 
of her estate to prevent fraud on part of guardian, since 
guardian may be held to account in guardianship proceedings 
for any alleged failure to preserve his ward's estate by failing 
to make a timely application for family allowance. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting a family allowance. Victor R. 
Hansen, Judge. Reversed. 
Leon U. Everhart, Edward Payson Hart and Montgomery 
G. Rice for Appellants. 
Harry A. Pines, Adele Walsh and Roy B. Woolsey for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The residuary legatees under the will of 
Alfred G. Blair, deceased, appeal from an order granting a 
family allowance out of his estate to the estate of his deceased 
widow, Susan Ann Blair. 
Alfred Blair died testate on July 8, 1950. He left surviv-
ing his widow and two adult children by a former marriage, 
Naomi Blair Ruoff and Alfred Granville Blair. Mrs. Ruoff 
is executrix of the estate. She is also a residuary legatee 
under the will. In August, 1950, the widow was declared an 
incompetent, and Mrs. Ruoff was appoiuted guardian of her 
person and estate. Her estate was sufficient to meet her needs. 
The court authorized Mrs. Ruoff to expend from Mrs. Blair's 
estate the sum of $500 per month for the widow's maintenance 
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and care. No attempt was made before the widow's d('ath 
in May, 1951, to secure a family allowance from her hushand's 
estate, although the estate was adequate. After Mrs. RIa it '8 
death the administratrix of her estate, Phoebe L. Bonnen, 
filed a petition for a family allowance. She later resigned, 
and Rebecca Riley, her successor and the present adminis-
tratrix, adopted her petition. The court ordered Mrs. Ruoff, 
as executrix, to pay to the administratrix of Mrs. Blair '8 
estate $5,216.58, i.e., $500 for each month between the death 
of Alfred Blair and the death of the widow. 
It is not disputed that the widow could have quaEued for 
a family allowance during her lifetime. The issue is whether 
the right exists in favor of her estate. 
[1] The right to a family allowance, which is entirely 
statutory (Estate of King, 19 Ca1.2d 354, 362 [121 P.2d 716] ; 
Hills v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 666, 667 [279 P. 805, 65 
A.L.R. 266] ; Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 280, 283 [168 P. 
117] ), is given by section 680 of the Probate Code: "The 
widow, widower, minor children, and adult children who 
have been declared incompetent by order of court are entitled 
to such reasonable allowance out of the estate as shall be 
necessary for their maintenance according to their circum-
stances, during the progress of the settlement of the estate, 
which, in case of an insolvent estate, must not continue longer 
than one year after granting letters. Such allowance must 
be paid in preference to all other charges, except funeral 
charges, expenses of the last illness and expenses of adminis-
tration, and may, in the discretion of the court or judge 
granting it, take effect from the death of the decedent." 
[2a] It is true, as respondent asserts that the family allow-
ance is favored by the law and that section 680 is liberally 
construed by the courts. The section, however, does not 
authorize the probate court to make an allowance in this case 
for the benefit of persons other than the widow. [3] It was 
enacted out of concern for the n~eds of the surviving family 
during the period of readjustment following the death of a 
spouse. (Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 280, 284 [168 P. 1171 ; 
In re Walkcrly, 77 Cal. 642. 645 [20 P. 150].) [4] The allow-
ance to meet those needs is preferred to most other claims 
(Prob. Code, § 750) ; and upon proper application, it must be 
granted even if the estate is insolvent. [2b] This highly 
preferential position accorded the family allowance is for the 
benefit only of persons designated in the statute. (Hil1s v. 
Superior Court, 207 Cal. 666, 668 [279 P. 805, 65 A.L.R. 2661·) 
) 
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[5] Respondent's claim is based upon the final clause of 
the section that in the discretion of the court the allowance 
may be granted retroactively to the date of the uecedent's 
death. Her contention is that even though the first part 
of the section can serve only to provide support for an (;xist-
ing person, the last clause is not so restricted. \Y e fJnd no 
basis in the section for this contention. The final clause, 
like the preceding ones, describes the scope of the right and 
sen'es the same purposes. The section has no application 
when there is no person to be maintained and thus no person 
to whom the section could apply. 
[6] The statutes relating to the family allowance (Prob. 
Code, § 680) and the probate homestead (Prob. Code, § 661) 
are so close in purpose, effect, and wording that cases con-
struing one are cited authoritatively in cases construing the 
other. (Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748, 750 [171 P.2d 724].) 
Both are based on the policy that places the welfare of the 
decedent's surviving family above the interests of his cred-
itors, heirs, legatees, and devisees; but the rights they confer 
are for the members of the family only, persons outside the 
family cannot assert them by assignment or succession. 
Altbough the precise question in this case is one of first 
instance, it has been held that rights similar to the right to 
a family allowance abate on the death of the widow. In 
Estate of Bachelder. 123 Cal. 466, 467 [56 P. 971. the widow's 
right under former section 1469 of the ,Code of Civil Proce-
dure, now Probate Code section 645, to have a small estate 
set apart to her "for the use and support of the family" 
was held to be a personal right that did not survive her death. 
In Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 437, it was held that the widow's 
right to have a probate homestead set apart to her was non-
assignable and that no one can succeed to the right to have 
a probate homestead set apart. "If a widow die before apply-
ing for a probate homestead, any right to apply which she 
might have had is gone; no person succeeds to that right .... " 
(57 Cal. 437, 445.) [7] Ordinarily a right that cannot be 
assigned does not survive the death of the person entitled 
to it. (California Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 207 Cal. 600 [279 
P. 664, 64 A.L.R. 1412] ; Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 206 
Cal. 461 [274 P. 959] ; see 1 Am.Jur., "Abatement and Re-
vival," § 80; 1 C.J.S., "Abatement and Revival," § 132.) 
In In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73 r 45 P. 1023], on which respondent 
relies, the widow died pending an appeal from an order grant-
) 
-) 
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ing her an allowance. The court held that since the order 
was properly granted before the widow's death, her estate 
could recover sums that had accrued under it during her life-
time. In the present case there was no order grantin.g a 
family allowance, and thus no money due or accrued under 
a valid order during the lifetime of the widow. 
Respondent invokes Estate of Brooks, 28 Ca1.2d 748 [171 
P.2d 724], and Estate of Moore, 170 Cal. 60 [148 P. 205], 
for the proposition that conditions that exist at the time of 
the decedent's death and not those existing later determine 
whether or not a family allowance can be granted. The Brooks 
case held that to qualify for either a family allowance or a 
probate homestead, the widow must be entitled to support 
from her husband at the time of his death. The case did 
not hold that the right to an allowance may not be lost by 
events occurring thereafter. The Moore case involved the 
right to a family allowance of a widow who remarried after 
her husband's death. An order was entered after the widow's 
remarriage granting an allowance for the period between 
the husband'. death and the widow's remarriage. Subse-
quently the court entered an order settling the adminis-
trator's account in which he claimed credit for amounts paid 
pursuant to the order for family allowance. The Moore 
case is not directly in point. It did not involve the question 
whether the right to a family allowance can survive the death 
of the widow (cf. Estate of Bachelder, supra, 123 Cal. 466, 
467). Moreover, it involved a collateral attack on the order 
for family allowance (Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328, 333 
[100 P.2d 1045] ; Estate of Nolan, 145 Cal. 559, 561 [79 P. 
428] ), and it was therefore necessary to decide only if the 
court had jurisdiction. In Rountree v. Montague, 30 Cal. 
App. 170, 177-178 [157 P. 623], it was held that the question 
of status does not go to the jurisdiction of the court and t.bat 
an order setting aside a probate homestead to a remarried 
widow, although erroneous, was not subject to collateral at-
tack. The Rountree case also indicated that the same rule 
applied to an order for family allowance. (30 Cal.App. 170, 
179.) [8] The rationale of the decision in the Moore case, how-
ever, is inconsistent with the long established rule that the 
right to a family allowance or probate homestead is lost when 
the one for whom it is asked has lost the status upon which 
the right depends (Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454, 457-459 
[166 P. 11, 3 A.L.R. 1396] ; Estate of Heywood, 149 Cat. 129, 
130-131 [84 P. 834] ; In re Still, 117 Cal. 509, 514 [49 P. 4631; 
) 
/ 
) 
Apr. 1954] ESTATE OF BLAlB 
f42 C.2d 728: 269 P.2d 612) 
733 
Estate of Hamilton, 66 Cal. 576 [6 P. 493] ; Estate of Moore, 
57 Cal. 437,443; Estate of Boland, 43 Cal. 640, 643; Estate of 
Gosnell, 63 Cal.App.2d 38. 39 [146 P.2d 42]), and is therefore 
disapproved. 
Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo.App. 91 [89 S.W.2d 
153, 158], on which respondent relies, involved a Missouri 
statute in which the right to "maintenance becomes vested 
in the surviving spouse immediately upon the death of the 
mate. " [9] In California. however. it is well established 
that the right to a family allowance or probate homestead is 
not a vested right and that nothing accrues before the order 
granting it. (Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454. 457 [166 
P. 11, 3 A.L.R. 1396] ; Estate of Heywood, 149 Cal. 129, 130-
131 [84 P. 834] ; In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73, 87 [45 P. 1023]; 
Estate of Boland, 43 Cal. 640, 642; Estate of Shapero, 39 
Cal.App.2d 144, 146 [102 P.2d 569].) 
Respondent relies on Mead v. Phillips, 135 F.2d 819, to 
support her contention that whatever the rule may be as to 
a competent widow, the right of an incompetent widow to 
a family allowance must be held to survive her death. The 
court held that a statute requiring the widow to renounce 
rights under the will or lose her common law rights did not 
apply to an incompetent widow. Just as in the Monahan 
case, mpra, the court was considering rights that vested in 
the widow on her husband's death and survived her own 
death, and the court held that her inability to make an elec-
tion within the statutory period because of incompetence did 
not defeat the power of the court to make the election for 
her after her death. [10] As noted above, however, in the pres-
ent case no right accrued before the death of the widow, and 
none could arise thereafter. [11] Moreover, it is not neces-
sary to rule in favor of the administratrix to prevent -fraud 
on the part of the guardian. The guardian may be held to 
account in the guardianship proceedings for any alleged fail-
ure to preserve his ward's estate by failing to make a timely 
application for family allowance. Respondent's contention 
that Estates of Boyes, 151 Cal. 143 [90 P. 454], precludes 
surcharging the guardian's account is unfounded. In that 
ease the written objections to the guardian's accounts con-
tained no suggestion of any claim that it was the guardian's 
duty to obtain a family allowance for his wards and that 
be('anse of his failure to do so he could not be allowed any 
Cl"edit for payments out of the wards' estates. The court 
) 
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held that evidence in support of this claim was inadmissible 
since the right of the contestants to surcharge the accounts 
was limited to those matters set up as grounds of contest 
in the written objections. (151 Cal. 143, 147.) The court 
also held that the question whether the guardian-administrator 
had breached a duty as administrator in failing to secure a 
family allowance for the wards could not be raised in excep-
tions to his guardianship accounts (151 Cal. 143, 152). It 
did not hold that his alleged breach of duty as guardian could 
not be so raised. 
The order is reversed. 
...... 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and Bray, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
